Radar, fence, and buried perimeter detection
Radar, fence and buried sensors measure different physical effects. Include installation conditions, environmental effects and uncertainty when interpreting their outputs.
Sources and scopeSource record 25 August 2026
Technical source record: 25 August 2026. Check the linked documentation for current product requirements.
Architecture and assurance only; no frequencies, detection thresholds, blind zone mapping, civil installation, radio licensing, tuning, or defeat detail.
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Overview#
Radar, fence mounted, buried, beam, and related perimeter sensors observe different physical effects. Their events are uncertain measurements shaped by geometry, installation, environment, calibration, and processing. Preserve those conditions rather than flattening every result into intrusion.
Technology roles#
| Family | Typical observation | Important uncertainty |
|---|---|---|
| radar | range/angle/velocity tracks or zone occupancy | terrain, clutter, multipath, occlusion, target cross section, RF conditions |
| fence mounted | vibration/strain/disturbance along a section | wind, vegetation, loose fabric, corrosion, maintenance, nearby activity |
| buried/field sensor | ground disturbance or field change | soil/water, trench/install consistency, surface traffic, seasonal change |
| active beam | interrupted transmission path | alignment, fog/rain/snow, vegetation, wildlife, contamination |
This table is a design prompt, not performance guidance. Exact technologies and products require vendor evidence and representative site validation.
Entity and state model#
Use stable IDs for device, processor, cable/channel, physical segment, logical zone, track, alarm, camera preset/view, power source, network path, and maintenance exclusion. Store configuration/calibration version and geospatial reference.
Separate raw observation, track/zone state, classification, alarm rule, correlated incident, and operator decision. Preserve confidence/quality and contradictions. Track normal, pre-alarm, alarm, tamper, masking, fault, degraded, maintenance, bypass, restore, and unknown independently where the product supports them.
For tracks, retain source track ID, creation/update/end time, position and uncertainty, speed/direction, class candidates, merge/split/handoff, and loss reason. A track ID is temporary and must not become a person identity.
Environmental baseline and change#
Commission against an approved operating envelope covering terrain, vegetation, fences/structures, weather, water/soil, wildlife, vehicles, radio environment, and legitimate activity. Record baseline and seasonal/physical changes. Civil works, fence repairs, landscaping, drainage, new structures, lighting, and software changes can invalidate earlier performance evidence.
Avoid fixed universal thresholds copied between sites. Configuration is security sensitive; changes need named authorisation, before/after evidence, versioning, and rollback.
Fusion and assessment#
Associate detections with cameras or other sensors using explicit geometry, time tolerance, and rule versions. A camera cue should show whether it is live, at the expected preset/view, recording, time aligned, and unobstructed. Loss of video assessment must remain visible even if the detector is healthy.
Fusion may use concurrence, sequence, direction, dwell, or track continuity, but must preserve source events and missed/contradictory evidence. Don't let a second unavailable sensor count as negative confirmation.
Supervision and resilience#
Monitor power, enclosure/tamper, cable/channel continuity where available, alignment, signal/noise/background trends, calibration age, event flow, processor resources, network, clock, configuration, storage, and destination receipt. A reachable processor doesn't prove its field sensor or detection performance.
Map shared poles, trenches, cable routes, power supplies, switches, radio links, processors, analytics services, and operations clients. Protect maintenance and test modes with expiry and alerting. Radio emitting equipment requires applicable spectrum authorisation and competent design.
Acceptance evidence#
- traceable zone objectives and authorised test scenarios;
- representative object, route, direction, speed, environment, and legitimate activity coverage;
- localization and camera association accuracy with time uncertainty;
- nuisance/missed event review and preserved raw evidence;
- tamper, masking, cut/link/power/processor failure and recovery;
- seasonal/change management plan and bounded maintenance exclusions.
Source baseline#
IEC 62642-1:2010 provides a system context for wired, wire free, and hybrid intrusion/hold up alarms. IEC 62676-6:2026 covers repeatable testing and grading for real time intelligent video analytics; use its stress aware testing principle only for video analytics, not as a claim of radar or fence conformity.
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